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AN ANALYSIS OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS:
ARE ALL COUNTRIES TREATED EQUALLY?
Justin S. Gruenberg*
This Note argues that the Security Council fails to treat all Mem-
bers of the United Nations equally, specifically singling out Israel, and to a 
lesser extent South Africa, for disparate treatment during the Cold War 
period. After introducing the Security Council, the Note creates a hierar-
chical classification system of wording in Security Council resolutions, spe-
cifically of emotive and instructive wording. Once the system is explained, 
the Note analyzes the words used in each Security Council resolution and 
cross-references those words with the Entity being discussed. To do this, the 
Note focuses on nine specific areas in which the disparate treatment among 
Members is evident, particularly with regards to Israel. The Note concludes 
by stressing the importance of correcting the underlying endemic flaws in 
the United Nations system rather than trying to patch problems with artifi-
cial devices, such as the Negroponte Doctrine. Only by ridding the Security 
Council of its biases can it serve the purpose it was created to fulfill. 
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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Security Council, created as a bastion of hope 
and international cooperation to contain and resolve threats to international 
peace and security around the world, has evolved into a political body 
whose resolutions are used to threaten and inequitably treat its Member 
countries. The unequal treatment strikes at the very core of the United Na-
tions’ purpose and trivializes the value of international cooperation. Specifi-
cally, Israel—and to a lesser extent South Africa—has been uniquely and 
excessively singled out for admo-
nishment by the Security Council, 
especially when comparing inci-
dents with those committed by 
other countries.  
To understand the impor-
tance of the Security Council and 
the role it plays in the United Na-
tions, it is necessary to examine the 
purpose the United Nations was 
created to serve and how the Secu-
rity Council fails to uphold the 
ideals and objectives of its found-
ers and Member countries. On June 
26, 1945, fifty-one countries met in 
San Francisco, California and 
signed the United Nations Charter.1
Following the victory over the 
Axis Powers in World War II, the victorious alliance of countries sought to 
1 LAWRENCE ZIRING ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND 
WORLD POLITICS 22–23 (3d ed. 2000). 
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maintain the cooperation that had proven so valuable in World War II.2 The 
victors resolved to maintain the alliance and create the United Nations or-
ganization.3 Collectively they declared, “[w]e the peoples of the United 
Nations [are] determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] in the equal rights of 
men and women and of nations large and small . . . .”4 To emphasize its 
purpose, the Charter continues, “[t]he Organization is based on the principle 
of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”5 In layman’s terms, the United 
Nations aspired to treat every country and its people equally. 
The founding countries were filled with excitement at the thought 
of an international organization that would support their interests.6 The 
United Nations was created as “humankind’s best hope for an enduring 
peace” and “promised a cooperative grouping of nations.”7 In the absence of 
a worldwide government,8 treaties provide the best method for diminishing 
conflicts between countries.9 Its founders believed the United Nations Char-
ter was such a treaty.10
Unfortunately, since its creation, the United Nations has not lived 
up to the lofty visions of its founders nor to the expectations of those that 
joined after its creation. The practices of the organization are often contra-
dictory to the principles espoused by the Charter. The founding states of the 
United Nations called for “the principle of equal rights” for all its Mem-
bers,11 but that principle has been ignored. Instead, Members of the United 
Nations generally place politics above their goal of preventing conflicts. 
Each body of the United Nations has flaws that are consistently exploited by 
powerful Members or blocs in order to discriminate against other countries. 
In the Security Council, the manipulated flaw is manifest in the ability of 
each of the five Permanent Members to veto any resolution it does not agree 
2 Id. at 19. 
3 Id.
4 U.N. Charter pmbl. (emphasis added). 
5 Id. art. 2, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
6 ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–2. 
7 Id. at 2. 
8 This impractical option would necessarily impinge on the sovereignty of each state, 
which goes against the principles of the United Nations. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (“The 
Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”) (em-
phasis added). 
9 See ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.  
10 See id.
11 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. 
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with.12 This provides blanket immunity in the Security Council to each of 
these countries and any close ally that country wishes to protect.  
Conversely, in the General Assembly where every country has an 
equal vote and no country is capable of vetoing any proposal, groups of 
countries often band together as “blocs” to vote in predetermined ways so as 
to strongly influence each vote.13 It is mathematically possible for a resolu-
tion in the General Assembly to be passed with a two-thirds vote by coun-
tries that make up less that 15 percent of the world’s population.14 Due to 
the heavy influences imposed by large blocs, General Assembly resolutions 
can single out specific countries excessively.15 Figure 1 shows the General 
Assembly’s fixation on resolutions regarding countries in the Middle East.16
The General Assembly’s fixation on Israel and the Middle East conflict has 
many possible explanations, including the United States’ consistent protec-
tion of Israel in the Security Council,17 an automatic majority in the General 
Assembly composed of Israel’s enemies,18 or just a general bias against 
Israel.19
Regrettably, this anti-Israel bias is not confined to the General As-
sembly; it is endemic throughout the United Nations. This disheartening 
12 Thomas Bruha, Security Council, in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES & PRACTICE
1147, 1152 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 1995). 
13 See THOMAS HOVET, JR., BLOC POLITICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS 8 (1960). Although 
countries informally joined together to support common policies, before 1960, the only true 
bloc in its technical sense was “the Soviet bloc, which to all intents and purposes operates as 
a single unit with nine votes, the number of its members.” Id. at 30–31. 
14 ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 85. See also id. at 94 (explaining the voting power of the 
Group of 77, which possesses the strength to defeat all opposition in the General Assembly); 
Christoph Schreuer, Regionalization, in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE
1059, 1060 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 1995) (declaring the Group of 77 to be among the most 
influential of the regional groups). 
15 For example, the General Assembly annually adopts resolutions stating that Israel “is 
not a peace-loving Member State” and calling on “all Member States to cease forthwith, 
individually and collectively, all dealings with Israel in order totally to isolate it in all fields.” 
HARRIS OKUN SCHOENBERG, A MANDATE FOR TERROR: THE UNITED NATIONS & THE PLO 
270–71 (1988). 
16 It is important to note that “[n]o [General] Assembly resolution has ever singled out the 
Palestinians for criticism.” Michael J. Jordan, Symbolic Fight for Israel at UN, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 8, 2003, at 6. 
17 See David A. Bosworth, American Crusade: The Religious Roots of the War on Terror,
7 BARRY L. REV. 65, 86 n.151 (2006). 
18 David L. Breau, The World Court’s Advisory Function: “Not Legally Well-Founded,”
14 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 185, 201–02 (2006). 
19 Michael Curtis, International Law and the Territories, 32 HARV. INT’L L. J. 457, 473 
(1991). The flaws of the General Assembly require a deep investigation of their own. This 
idea is briefly introduced here only as another example of the fallibility of the United Nations 
organization so as not to imply that the Security Council is the only body that is hijacked by 
Members for political purposes. 
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conclusion was volunteered by the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi 
Annan, in his opening address to the sixty-first session of the General As-
sembly. Annan admitted, “supporters of Israel feel that it is harshly judged, 
by standards that are not applied to its enemies—and too often this is true, 
particularly in some UN bodies.”20 The United Nations’ failure to treat all 
of its Members equally, the very precept the international organization was 
founded upon, is consistently demonstrated by its treatment of Israel.21 This 
Note explores the depths of that disparate treatment. 
Section II of this Note describes the methodology used to compile 
the data presented here. This section explains which types of statistics were 
recorded and how the data were chosen. 
Section III introduces the Security Council. This section begins by 
describing the structure, methods, and purposes of the Council. It continues 
by introducing the role regional groups play in the Security Council and 
how Israel’s exclusion from the regional group structure violates the United 
Nations Charter. The section concludes with an explanation of Security 
Council resolutions. 
Section IV presents a hierarchical classification system of the words 
used in Security Council resolutions. This section explains the ranking of 
emotive words, instructive words, and modifying words through examples, 
definitions, and their placement in resolutions. 
Finally, section V analyzes Security Council resolution wording 
based on the classification system created in Section IV. This section begins 
by distinguishing between resolutions of the Cold War era, in which the 
Security Council excessively focused on Israel and South Africa, and the 
resolutions of the post-Cold War era. It continues by comparing the words 
used in Israel-centric resolutions with resolutions about other Middle East-
ern Entities when both countries engaged in similar behaviors. This section 
then explores the Security Council’s focus on South Africa’s apartheid re-
gime. It concludes with a brief discussion of the Negroponte Doctrine, how 
it has affected the balance of the wording used in Security Council resolu-
tions, and future implications. 
II. METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY
Since its inception, the Security Council has debated thousands of 
issues—referred to here as “Subjects”—and has published almost eighteen 
20 The Secretary-General, Struggle to Confront Three Global Challenges - Development, 
Security, Human Rights, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10643 (Sep. 
19, 2006) (emphasis added). 
21 H.R. Res. 624, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted). The United Nations’ unequal treatment of 
Members is most clearly and repeatedly evidenced in the treatment of Israel, discussed infra,
Section V.B. 
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hundred resolutions.22 Certain Subjects have inspired hundreds of resolu-
tions,23 while other comparably important Subjects have inspired very few 
or no resolutions.24 This Note focuses on the words used by the United Na-
tions Security Council in resolutions that pertain to each Subject it has ad-
dressed. I compared the wording used by the Security Council in resolutions 
that were directed toward different Entities when the Subjects were similar. 
Since the Subject of a resolution does not always relate to the actions of a 
country—sometimes, instead of a country, the Council addresses a non-state 
actor—this Note refers to the target of the each Security Council resolution 
as an “Entity.” I also compared factually similar Subjects regarding differ-
ent Entities when only one of the Subjects produced a Security Council res-
olution.25
I analyzed every Security Council resolution and recorded statistics 
in three areas: (1) the wording used; (2) the details employed; and (3) the 
frequency of the resolutions. Since the Security Council has considered 
hundreds of Subjects over the last sixty-three years, I focused on the Sub-
jects discussed in this Note for one or more of the following reasons: (A) 
the Security Council spent a large amount of its time considering the Sub-
ject; (B) the Security Council spent very little of its time considering the 
Subject, but it resulted in numerous fatalities; (C) the Security Council used 
poignant word choices in describing the Subject; or (D) the Security Coun-
cil used contrasting wording in describing analogous Subjects. 
After cross-referencing the Subject of each resolution with both the 
Entity and the wording, details and frequency data described above, I per-
formed a content analysis on the statistics collected.26 Content analysis is “a 
research technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively 
identifying specified characteristics within a text.”27 To perform this type of 
22 S.C. Res. 1794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1794 (Dec. 21, 2007). 
23 For example, Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait was the Subject of twenty-five Security 
Council resolutions between August 2, 1990 and October 11, 1991. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 715, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/715 (Oct. 11, 1991); S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990). 
24 For example, due to the Permanent Members’ involvement in the Vietnamese Civil 
War, the Security Council did not produce a single resolution on the conflict. ROBERT F.
GORMAN, GREAT DEBATES AT THE UNITED NATIONS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FIFTY KEY ISSUES,
1945–2000, at 174 (2001). 
25 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 681, U.N. Doc. S/RES/681 (Dec. 20, 1990) (describing Israel’s 
deportation of Palestinians); DAVID W. LESCH, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A HISTORY 236 
(2008) (discussing the “Black September” civil war in Jordan in which Palestinians were 
killed and exiled). For additional examples, see infra, Section V.B.3. 
26 As of the date of this Note, no one has ever attempted to analyze the wording of Securi-
ty Council resolutions by means of a content analysis or in any other manner.  
27 PHILIP J. STONE ET AL., THE GENERAL INQUIRER: A COMPUTER APPROACH TO CONTENT 
ANALYSIS 5 (1966). For a thorough explanation of content analysis and its history, see Klaus 
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analysis, the researcher must create a classification structure by which to 
compare the data.28 The classification system used here is intricately de-
scribed in Section IV.  
III. THE SECURITY COUNCIL
A. Background 
Before hierarchically classifying and explaining the wording used 
in Security Council resolutions, it is important to understand how the Secu-
rity Council works. The Security Council is one of six principal organs 
created by the United Nations Charter.29 The other enumerated bodies in-
clude the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trustee-
ship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat.30 The 
principal responsibility of the Security Council is to maintain international 
peace and security.31 Fifteen Members sit on the Security Council; five are 
Permanent Members and the other ten are elected by the General Assembly 
every two years.32 The five Permanent Members are the People’s Republic 
of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union), 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United 
States of America.33 When the two year term of a non-Permanent Member 
concludes, it is not eligible to be immediately re-elected.34 This gives a va-
riety of countries the opportunity to participate in Security Council deci-
sions, which is a very prestigious honor.35
Although meetings of the Security Council are not fixed, the Char-
ter requires that the Security Council meet at least every fourteen days.36 A 
meeting may be called for a variety of reasons other than the mandatory 
Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology, in 5 SAGE COMMTEXT
SERIES 13–20 (F. Gerald Kline ed., 1980). 
28 Id. at 27. Each system of content analysis, while performed objectively, is created by the 
individual analyst and, thus, subject to the perspective of the analyst. Id. at 26. However, by 
clearly enumerating the method used to compile and analyze the data, the data is replicable 
and valid inferences can be made from their context. Id. at 21. 
29 U.N. Charter art. 7, para. 1. 
30 Id.
31 Id. art. 24, para. 1–2. 
32 Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.15 (1985). 
33 U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1. Following its collapse, the Soviet Union was replaced on 
the Security Council by Russia. The original Republic of China, a founding Member of the 
United Nations, was officially replaced in 1971 by the People’s Republic of China under the 
United Nations’ One China policy. 
34 Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, supra note 32, at 144. 
35 ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 50. 
36 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev.7 
(1983).
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time period: a request by a Member of the Security Council, a request from 
the General Assembly or the Secretary General, a circumstance dictated by 
the United Nations Charter, or an initiative by the President of the Security 
Council.37 At these meetings, any Member whose interests are affected by 
the topic being discussed in the Security Council has the right to participate 
in the discussion.38 Furthermore, any state or group—regardless of whether 
it is a Member of the United Nations—must be invited to any discussion of 
a dispute to which it is a party.39 However, neither of these rights provides 
the invited guest a vote in the Security Council’s final decision on the dis-
pute.40
Although maintaining international peace and security is now con-
sidered to be solely within the dominion of the Security Council, this struc-
ture was not the only proposal.41 During the formation of the United Nations 
Charter at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in 
June of 1945, several proposals were presented that would have allowed the 
General Assembly to play an integral role in preserving international peace 
and security.42 One possibility would have mandated that all decisions of the 
Security Council be submitted to the General Assembly for ratification; 
however, that suggestion was judged to be too cumbersome and likely to 
inhibit decisive actions by the Security Council.43 The idea of giving the 
General Assembly a strong hand in Security Council proceedings was even-
tually rejected because the General Assembly already affects the Security 
Council by electing the majority of its Members.44
37 Id. at 1–3; ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 51. 
38 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, supra note 36, at 37; U.N. 
Charter art. 31; ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 51. 
39 U.N. Charter art. 32; ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 51. 
40 U.N. Charter art. 31–32; ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 51. Giving parties to the dispute 
a vote would provide a vote to an unelected or non-Permanent Member of the United Na-
tions, in contravention to the Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 23. Additionally, even if it was 
not in breach of the Charter, it would presumably add one vote to each side and make it more 
difficult to reach a supermajority of 60 percent of the Security Council required to approve a 
resolution. A supermajority requiring nine of fifteen is 60 percent approval. If a supermajori-
ty of 60 percent is needed from seventeen votes, eleven votes would be required for approv-
al, since ten votes would only be 58 percent. 
41 David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council Under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice, in 8 STUDIES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 27 (Peter Malanczuk ed., 
2001).
42 Id. at 26–27. 
43 Id. at 27 (citing Report of Paul-Boncour, 11 UNCIO DOCS., at 14). Adding another step 
to the process of decision-making in order to protect international peace and security would 
inhibit the ability to react quickly to any challenges that arise. 
44 Id.
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The General Assembly elects a majority of the Members to the Se-
curity Council, but the Permanent Members have a crucial advantage over 
the elected Members: a veto.45 Any Permanent Member can veto any resolu-
tion proposed in the Security Council without explanation.46 Often, a Per-
manent Member uses the veto to protect an ally; thus, the veto is an “in-
strument of political protectionism.”47 The ability to veto, or even just the 
threat of a veto, has had a large impact on the productivity of the Security 
Council.48
While there are only five individual vetoes on the Security Coun-
cil—one available for each Permanent Member—no Permanent Member is 
capable of compelling a non-Permanent Member into agreeing to a resolu-
tion or declaration.49 Technically, any seven non-Permanent Members band-
ing together have a cumulative veto because a super-majority of nine out of 
fifteen votes must approve every resolution.50 This theoretical non-
Permanent Member veto is not often discussed because it has never oc-
curred and many consider it implausible that seven divergent states with 
different interests would join together to block a resolution; however, it 
remains a possibility that the Permanent Members cannot ignore.51
B. Regional Groups 
Regional groups play a very important role in the United Nations, 
especially in the Security Council.52 A regional group is a collection of 
45 Bruha, supra note 12, at 1152. 
46 Id. For the history of the negotiations over the Permanent Member veto, see STANLEY 
MEISLER, UNITED NATIONS: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS 9–19 (1995).  
47 Bruha, supra note 12, at 1156–57. 
48 David M. Malone, Security Council in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED 
NATIONS 117, 120 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2007) (explaining that during the 
Cold War, due to the veto, many “key challenges to international peace and security” were 
ignored, some of which included the Berlin Blockade, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Prague 
Spring, and the Vietnam War). For a discussion of the Permanent Member veto, see infra
notes 164–174 and accompanying text. 
49 See Bruha, supra note 12, at 1153. 
50 Id. To demonstrate, if the five Permanent Members agree that any country with more 
than 60,000,000 citizens should never be asked to supply any of its own citizens for United 
Nations peace-keeping operations, then seven non-Permanent Members can prevent the 
resolution from being approved. Panama, Vietnam, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, 
Libya and Croatia—each with less than 15,000,000 citizens and a seat on the Security Coun-
cil in 2008—would likely be strongly opposed to this resolution and, thus, capable of band-
ing together to veto that resolution. 
51 Id.
52 Robert Jennings, Opinion Regarding The Exclusion of Israel from the United Nations 
Regional Group System, ¶ 3 (Nov. 4 1999) available at
http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/222.pdf (“[R]egional groups . . . [are] an es-
sential part of the whole working structure of the Organisation.”). 
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countries that “control elections to UN-related positions, dividing up the pie 
on the basis of geographic representation, as well as coordinate substantive 
policy, and form common fronts for negotiations.”53 Each non-Permanent 
Member of the Security Council is elected within its own regional group.54
Five non-Permanent Members are selected by the Asia and Africa groups, 
one by Eastern Europe, two by Latin America, and two by Western Euro-
pean and Others (WEOG).55 This distribution, which is “proportional to the 
geographical and political situation of the members, is intended to assure 
the widest possible participation in the power concentration of the Security 
Council, as well as the representation of the most particular interests of all 
[M]ember states.”56 These non-Permanent Members fill the majority of 
seats on the Security Council, thereby substantially affecting the agenda and 
resolutions.
The United Nations Charter explicitly states that non-Permanent 
Members of the Security Council are selected with regard to their contribu-
tions toward the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as 
an equitable geographical distribution.57 The use of regional groups for ap-
pointing non-Permanent Members prevents countries from banding together 
to fill each position. For example, in the General Assembly, the Group of 77 
has the strength to defeat all opposition.58 If the General Assembly at large 
was tasked with electing all ten non-Permanent Members of the Security 
Council without the restrictions of regional groups, the Group of 77 could 
always control which ten countries would serve on the Security Council.59
53 EYE ON THE UN, POLITICAL ALLIANCES WITHIN THE UN, 
http://www.eyeontheun.com/view.asp?l=11&p=55 (last visited Aug. 2, 2008). 
54 ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 50. 
55 G.A. Res. 1991 (XVIII), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (Dec. 17, 1963). 
56 Bruha, supra note 12, at 1151. 
57 ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 49. 
58 Id. at 94. The Group of 77 was created “to articulate and promote [the groups’] collec-
tive economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international 
economic issues within the United Nations system . . . .” THE GROUP OF 77, ABOUT THE 
GROUP OF 77, http://www.g77.org/doc. As of 2008, 130 countries comprised the Group of 77. 
THE GROUP OF 77, MEMBER STATES, http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html. Originally 
founded in 1964 at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the 
group has almost doubled in size since its creation. Mir A. Ferdowsi, Group of 77 and the 
UN in A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS 154, 154 (Helmut Volger ed., 
2002). Since it is single-handedly able to control the majority of the General Assembly, the 
Group of 77 is among the most influential of the regional groups. Schreuer, supra note 14, at 
1060.
59 This example is set forth as a demonstration of what could theoretically occur if region-
al groups were not involved in the process of appointing non-Permanent Members of the 
Security Council. This example does not evaluate the probability of whether an issue specific 
group—such as the Group of 77 and its focus on economic issues—could come to a consen-
sus on such a far reaching and broad decision. 
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Chapter VIII of the Charter discusses the role regional groups play 
in the United Nations and how they relate to the Security Council.60 In de-
termining what countries comprise a regional group, geography, political 
affiliation, economic development, and other considerations must each be 
taken into account.61 The United Nations’ use of regional groups is based 
upon  
[a] recognition by participating governments that not all problems are ei-
ther national or global in scope. Some international problems may be con-
fined to a geographic region; their solutions may require action by only a 
limited number of states, or psychological, technical, or administrative dif-
ficulties may limit the ability of international agencies to function beyond 
the region. International regionalism exists, therefore, because groups of 
states have found it to be the most appropriate means of solving some 
common problems.62
In practice, the function of a regional group in the General Assem-
bly is comparable to that of a political party in a parliamentary democracy, 
making the United Nations’ body more efficient.63 Like political parties, the 
groups often develop “common positions on important agenda items” so as 
to agree on how a unified vote should be carried out.64
Although regional group participation is not mandatory, only two 
countries—Israel and the United States—are not a part of the regional group 
structure.65 The United States voluntarily chooses not to partake in WEOG, 
except for electoral matters.66 Due to its immense political influence, Amer-
ica is able to refuse any responsibilities that may be required of other mem-
bers in a regional group and use the group only for electing United Nations 
representatives. In contrast, for over forty years, Israel has been consistently 
denied membership in the Asian group due to refusal by the Arab League.67
Finally, in 2000, Israel was invited into the WEOG, but only on a temporary 
basis.68 As a result of its restricted status, Israel is not permitted to partake 
60 U.N. Charter art. 52–54. 
61 Schreuer, supra note 14, at 1059. 
62 ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 31. 
63 Schreuer, supra note 14, at 1060. 
64 Id.
65 ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 91. 
66 Id. Despite its name, the WEOG is the only regional group that is not based on geo-
graphical location of a group; instead it serves as a group for politically aligned countries. 
67 See Barbara Crossette, Israel's Bittersweet Moment: One Step Out of Isolation at U.N.,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1992, at A6. Israel was the only country denied from joining its geo-
graphical regional group. EYE ON THE UN, supra note 53. 
68 Crossette, supra note 67; EYE ON THE UN, supra note 53. In 2004, Israel’s participation 
in the WEOG was approved for indefinite extension, but it has yet to be permanently admit-
ted. H.R. Res. 624, supra note 21. 
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in any group activities or deliberations outside of the United States.69 While 
the headquarters of the United Nations is located in New York, the three 
other important WEOG offices—the European headquarters in Geneva, and 
offices in Vienna and Nairobi—are not open to Israeli representatives.70
These limitations, which are not placed upon any other Members of the 
United Nations, are far more than just symbolic restrictions on Israel. 
For example, Israel is prevented from caucusing in Geneva, where 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights is headquartered,71 a 
committee renowned for its extensive focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict.72
The Commission, long criticized as an ineffective body that ignored the 
human rights violations of its members, was, in effect, replaced by the Unit-
ed Nations Human Rights Council in 2006.73 Despite the change in name 
and structure, the successor Council continues to inordinately focus on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Even the President of the new Human Rights Council 
has explicitly stated that the Council has failed with respect to the Arab-
Israeli conflict.74 This is just one example of a United Nations organ that 
Israel is denied access to participate in as a restricted member of the 
WEOG. 
In 1999, Israel’s exclusion from the regional group structure of the 
United Nations was comprehensively condemned by Sir Robert Jennings, 
former President of the International Court of Justice and noted judge. He 
declared that Israel’s “rights as a Member of the United Nations to partici-
pate in the work of the United Nations are largely nullified by its exclusion 
from membership [in] a regional group.”75 This exclusion was “manifestly 
unlawful and constitutes a breach of both the letter and the spirit of the 
Charter of the United Nations.”76 Although he wrote this position paper 
before Israel was temporarily admitted to the WEOG, Jennings would likely 
agree that Israel’s current limitations—its non-permanent admission to 
WEOG and inability to participate outside of America—still prevent it from 
69 Crossette, supra note 67. 
70 Ruth Wedgwood, Recent Books on International Law: Book Review, 99 A.J.I.L 284, 
285 n.6 (2005); H.R. Res. 624, supra note 21. 
71 Crossette, supra note 67. 
72 Id.
73 Morton H. Halperin & Diane F. Orentlicher, The New UN Human Rights Council, 13 
No. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF. 1, 1 (2006). The Council is elected by the General Assembly, there-
by making the Council members accountable to the entire United Nations for their own coun-
tries protection of human rights. Id. at 4. This is a drastic change from the previous body. 
74 Stéphane Bussard, International: Au sujet de la Palestine, le Conseil a échoué [About 
Palestine, the Council Failed], LE TEMPS (France), Sep. 29, 2007, available at
http://www.letemps.ch/template/print.asp?article=215936. 
75 Jennings, supra note 52, ¶ 4. 
76 Id.
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being treated as equal to other Members of the United Nations. Giving 
Israel anything less than “full and equal participation in the work of the 
United Nations  . . . is a breach by Members of their obligations under the 
Charter.”77
C. Resolutions 
The Security Council publishes its determinations through resolu-
tions, presidential statements, or informal press briefings by the President.78
The Charter does not direct any United Nations body to use a particular 
form for publication of its decisions, nor does it discuss the legal effect of 
these pronouncements. Presidential statements are decisions to which every 
Member of the Security Council agrees.79 This form has recently become 
more popular and is typically used to express the opinion of the Security 
Council where the formality of a resolution is not necessary.80
The most common action of the Security Council is to issue a reso-
lution on the Subject it is currently discussing.81 Although the Charter does 
not use the term “resolution,”82 its use stems from the legal history of the 
United States and “describes an official expression of opinion of a parlia-
mentary assembly.”83 Since the Charter does not dictate the method by 
which the Security Council must publish its determinations, the Members of 
the Council decided  that resolutions were the optimal mode to announce its 
conclusions.  Resolutions are “the common legal instrument for an organ or 
body to make a recommendation or statement, recall a fact, express an opi-
nion, or undertake any other matter of substance.”84 The importance of Se-
curity Council resolutions, combined with their infrequent invocation and 
77 Id. ¶ 12. 
78 See Ingo Winkelmann, Security Council, in A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS, supra note 58, at 497, 501.
79 Stefan Talmon, The Statements by the President of the Security Council, 2 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 419, 419 (2003). Presidential statements are introduced here only so far as to present 
the options of the Security Council for publishing its determinations. 
80 Anthony Aust, The Procedure and Practice of the Security Council Today, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 365, 370 (Rene-Jean Dupy ed., 1993). 
This Note focuses on resolutions rather than other publications due to the importance and 
formality associated with them. For an in-depth analysis of Presidential Statements, see 
Talmon, supra note 79. 
81 Rainer Lagoni, Resolution, Declaration, Decision in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES
AND PRACTICE 1081, 1081 (Rudiger Wolfrum & Christine Philipp eds., 1995). 
82 See Bardo Fassbender, Resolution, Declaration, Decision in A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 58, at 473, 475.
83 Id. at 473. 
84 Lagoni, supra note 81, at 1081. 
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extensive vocabulary,85 demonstrates a necessity for creating a hierarchical 
classification system from which the Security Council’s choice of words in 
resolutions can be given meaning and properly analyzed. 
IV. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WORDING
When drafting resolutions, the Security Council uses a cornucopia 
of words and phrases to attach particular meanings to its statements. As of 
this printing, no other researcher has published a study of the wording used 
in Security Council resolutions. The only data compilation in a remotely 
related area is a survey of wording in General Assembly resolutions in 1988 
by former Director of the General Legal Division of the United Nations 
Legal Office Blaine Sloan.86 However, Sloan merely counted the incidence 
of specific words; he did not classify the words in a hierarchical system, nor 
did he consider the variation of words depending on the Subject or Entity at 
issue.87 Perhaps the most marked distinction is that Sloan only examined 
General Assembly resolutions, which are significantly different from Secu-
rity Council resolutions.88
In constructing a classification system for content analysis, I fo-
cused on three different types of words the Security Council uses, which are 
referred to here as emotive words, instructive words, and modifiers. First, 
emotive words connote feelings on behalf of the Security Council regarding 
the Subject of the resolution. For example, the Security Council has ex-
pressed its “concern” 2,793 times in its first 1,794 resolutions. Second, in-
structive words state the amount of urgency the Security Council attaches to 
the action stated in the resolution. These words usually illustrate the influ-
ence the Security Council intends to apply to the Entity of the resolution. 
For example, the Security Council has “requested” an action 2,793 times.89
Finally, modifiers increase the strength of a word by using an adverb to 
amplify the meaning of the word it modifies. For example, “strongly con-
demns” is an incremental escalation in force from merely “condemns.”90
Neither the United Nations nor the Security Council has created any 
definitions or hierarchical classification systems from which targeted Enti-
85 The United Nations Security Council only published 1794 resolutions in its first sixty-
two years, compared with 11,960 resolutions by the General Assembly during the same 
period.
86 BLAINE SLOAN, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS IN OUR CHANGING 
WORLD 9 (1991). 
87 Id.
88 Id. For examples of the difference between the General Assembly and the Security 
Council, see supra notes 12–20 and accompanying text. 
89 “Requested” is less commanding than “demanded.” For the hierarchical classification of 
all instructive words, see Section IV.B and Table B.  
90 See William Safire, Strongly Condemn, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1992, at A23. 
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ties or researchers can analyze the Security Council’s word selection. Fur-
thermore, many of the divergent words used are considered synonyms of 
each other according to the dictionary, yet appear to convey messages of 
different intensities. Consequently, I have scrutinized both the dictionary 
definitions of the terms and their context and usage in resolutions. While 
this may seem circular in logic, only by determining the context in which 
words are used can I analyze their placement in other resolutions. To create 
a proper classification system free of preconceived notions, I recorded the 
frequency of word choices prior to constructing a hierarchy of the words. 
To further clarify this classification system, the words included in 
this analysis encompass most of the word choices employed by the Security 
Council.91 When reading Security Council resolutions, I searched for the 
context the words were used in, and recorded the use of a word only if it 
was in accordance with the expression of a feeling. For example, where the 
Security Council “[f]urther requests the Secretary-General to submit to the 
Council, in consultation with all parties concerned, detailed proposals . . . ,” 
I did not include that as an example of when the Security Council was “con-
cerned.”92 Additionally, I searched for the root of each word rather than the 
exact form located in Tables A and B. For example, where the Security 
Council declared it is “[e]xpressing concern at the increase in crime across 
the ceasefire line . . . ,”93 I considered that an occurrence of when the Secu-
rity Council used the term “concerned.” 
A. Emotive Wording 
The Security Council uses a 
wide vocabulary to describe its institu-
tional feelings towards particular ac-
tions. Table A shows the range of emo-
tive words from weakest to strongest. 
The most common word used in resolu-
tions, which connotes the feelings of 
the Security Council, is “concerned.” 
For example, the Security Council 
stated it was “[c]oncerned about the 
91 The Security Council uses such a wide vocabulary that the words used here had to be 
limited in order to properly analyze them. To do this, I considered words that the Security 
Council used more than once and were found in similar Subjects so as to properly rank them 
in the classification system. Although this may not be the optimal system, it is the only way 
to be able to perform a meaningful analysis of the data. 
92 S.C. Res. 1332, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1332 (Dec. 14, 2000) (emphasis added). 
93 S.C. Res. 1604, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1604 (June 15, 2005) (emphasis added). 
Emotive Words 
From Weakest to Strongest 
Concerned 
Grieved 
Deplored 
Condemned 
Alarmed 
Shocked
Indignant 
Censured 
Table A.
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escalation of politically motivated violence in Haiti at this time of critical 
political transition.”94 Webster’s Dictionary defines “concerned” as being 
“interested or affected; troubled or anxious.”95 “Concerned” is used 2,793 
times in 1,794 resolutions and is the least urgent sentiment; it often indicates 
a brewing problem that the Security Council may examine.96
The next strongest word in the spectrum is “grieved.” For example, 
the Security Council has asserted that it was “[g]rieved at the tragic loss of 
human life, mainly that of civilians.”97 “Grieved” is defined as “to feel or 
cause to feel grief.”98 This term has been used twenty-three times by the 
Security Council only, but not always, when it states its feelings about the 
loss of life or damage to property.99 Typically, use of the word “grieved” is 
merely a reflection on past events rather than a word that connotes a contin-
uation of disappointment into the future such as the word “deplore.”100
The word “deplore[d]” has been used by the Security Council 216 
times. For example, with respect to the Iran-Iraq War, the Council 
“[d]eplor[ed] . . . the bombing of purely civilian population centres, attacks 
on neutral shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international huma-
nitarian law and other laws of armed conflict, and, in particular, the use of 
chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva Proto-
col.”101 “Deplored” means “to regret deeply; to disapprove of; censure.”102
To reach the level of “deplore,” the Entity of the resolution must be per-
ceived as violating customary international law in some form. All Security 
Council resolutions using the term “deplore” describe Subjects similar to 
94 S.C. Res. 867, U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 (Sep. 23, 1993). 
95 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, CLASSIC EDITION 135 (1st ed. 1999) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S
DICTIONARY]. 
96 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 259, U.N. Doc. S/RES/259 (Sep. 27, 1968). 
97 S.C. Res. 571, U.N. Doc. S/RES/571 (Sep. 20, 1985). 
98 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 290. Grief is defined as a cause of keen 
distress or sorrow. Id.
99 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 271, U.N. Doc. S/RES/271 (Sep. 15, 1969). (The Security Council is 
“[g]rieved at the extensive damage caused by arson to the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusa-
lem on 21 August 1969 under the military occupation of Israel.”). 
100 Compare id. with S.C. Res. 259, supra note 96 (“Deploring the delay in the implemen-
tation of resolution 237 (1967) because of the conditions still being set by Israel for receiving 
a Special Representative of the Secretary-General”).
101 S.C. Res. 598, U.N. Doc. S/RES/598 (July 20, 1987). 
102 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 176. This definition exemplifies that al-
though the strongest emotive word used by the Security Council, “censure,” is a synonym, 
the context and Subjects using the word “deplor[ed]” dictate that “deplor[ed]” falls far lower 
on the hierarchical scale.  
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the Iran-Iraq War example.103 The Security Council also uses “deplore” 
when criticizing the destruction of property or loss of lives, although 
breaches of international law are often the causes of those results.104 Pulitzer 
Prize winner and noted etymologist, William Safire, agrees that “deplored” 
is a step below “condemned,” ignoring any modifiers, on the scale of harsh 
language employed by the Security Council in its resolutions.105
Of all the emotive words used in Security Council resolutions, the 
term “condemn” is probably the most familiar to the public at large.106 It is 
the strongest emotive word that is used commonly in Security Council reso-
lutions.107 For example, the Security Council has “[c]ondemn[ed] the apar-
theid policies of the Government of the Republic of South Africa . . . .”108
“Condemn” means “to express strong disapproval of; to sentence to severe 
punishment; to pronounce guilty.”109 It is used quite often—623 times—for 
a large variety of Subjects that are serious enough to warrant a harsh rebuke 
by the Security Council, mostly violations of human rights.110
Next on the hierarchical list are the terms “alarmed” and “shocked.” 
Neither of these terms is used very often. For instance, the Security Council 
has “[e]xpresse[d] alarm at the violence which took place on 8 October at 
the Haram al-Sharif and other Holy Places of Jerusalem resulting in over 
twenty Palestinian deaths and the injury of more than one hundred and fifty 
people.”111 “Alarmed” means “sudden fear caused by danger; to make fear-
ful.”112 In addition to expressing its outrage over certain Subjects, the Secu-
rity Council uses “alarmed” to describe the failure of Members to comply 
with previous resolutions.113 Once the human rights violations increase in 
103 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 108, U.N. Doc. S/RES/108 (Sep. 8, 1955) (“Deploring the recent 
outbreak of violence in the area along the armistice demarcation line established between 
Egypt and Israel”). 
104 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 256, U.N. Doc. S/RES/256 (Aug. 16, 1968) (“Deplores the loss of 
life and heavy damage to property”). 
105 Safire, supra note 90, at A23. 
106 See id.
107 No instructive word that is stronger than “condemn” is used more than ten times by the 
Security Council. 
108 S.C. Res. 191, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/191 (June 18, 1964). 
109 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 136. 
110 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 945, U.N. Doc. S/RES/945 (Sep. 29, 1994) (“Condemns any action, 
including laying of landmines, which threatens the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian 
assistance to all in need in Angola and puts the lives of the humanitarian relief workers at 
risk”).
111 S.C. Res. 672, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/672 (Oct. 12, 1990). 
112 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 16. 
113 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 665, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (Aug. 25, 1990) (“Gravely alarmed that 
Iraq continues to refuse to comply with resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) and 
664 (1990) . . . .”). 
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intensity, the Security Council raises the harshness of the wording to 
“shocked.” For example, the Security Council was “[s]hocked at the tragic 
incident that resulted in the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi 
on 6 April 1994.”114 “Shocked” means “a sudden or violent disturbance of 
the emotions or sensibilities.”115 It has been used only eight times in Securi-
ty Council resolutions, seven of which refer to loss of life.116 The combina-
tion of both shocked and alarmed has been used only once, to describe an 
invasion of a Member by another Member.117
Another seldom used, but powerful word is the term “indignation.” 
For example, the Security Council expressed its “[i]ndigna[tion] at the con-
tinued executions of freedom fighters by the illegal regime [of Southern 
Rhodesia].”118 “Indignation” means “strong displeasure at something consi-
dered unjust, offensive, insulting, or base.”119 It has only been used in ten 
resolutions, each time referring to a violation of territorial integrity or kil-
lings.120
Finally, the word the Security Council uses to indicate its strongest 
displeasure is the world “censure.” In 1966, the Security Council 
“[c]ensure[d] Israel for [a] large-scale military action in violation of the 
United Nations Charter.”121 “Censure” is defined as a “strong disapproval; 
to criticize harshly.”122 This word has been used only seven times with re-
gards to an Entity, none since 1982.123 William Safire considers censure to 
be very serious chastisement of an action, more serious than a “condemna-
tion.”124 “Censure” is usually used after previous resolutions have been ig-
114 S.C. Res. 912, U.N. Doc. S/RES/912 (Apr. 21, 1994). 
115 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 610. 
116 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 392, U.N. Doc. S/RES/392 (June 19, 1976) (“Deeply shocked over 
large-scale killings and wounding of Africans in South Africa, following the callous shooting 
of African people including schoolchildren and students demonstrating against racial dis-
crimination on 16 June 1976”). The only instance the Security Council used “shocked” with-
out a death involved was in describing an assassination attempt. S.C. Res. 471, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/471 (June 5, 1980) (“Shocked by the assassination attempts against the Mayors of 
Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh”). 
117 S.C. Res. 517, U.N. Doc. S/RES/517 (Aug. 4, 1982) (“Deeply shocked and alarmed by 
the deplorable consequences of the Israeli invasion of Beirut on 3 August 1982.”). 
118 S.C. Res. 423, U.N. Doc. S/RES/423 (Mar. 14, 1978). 
119 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 337. 
120 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 568, U.N. Doc. S/RES/568 (June 21, 1985). 
121 S.C. Res. 228, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/228 (Nov. 25, 1966). 
122 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 105. 
123 S.C. Res. 517, supra note 117. 
124 See William Safire, On Language; Empowerment and Denouncement, N.Y. TIMES, July 
15, 1990, at 12. 
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nored in combination with another action that violates the Charter.125 Secu-
rity Council Resolutions 245 and 246 demonstrate the increase of strength 
from “condemn” to “censure.” In Resolution 245, the Security Council 
“[c]ondemn[ed] the refusal of the Government of South Africa to comply” 
with its order to release and repatriate South West Africans.126 The follow-
ing resolution then “[c]ensur[ed] the Government of South Africa for its 
flagrant defiance of Security Council resolution 245.”127 The escalation in 
wording of resolutions on this Subject demonstrates that in Security Council 
resolutions, “censure” is a stronger emotive word than “condemn.” 
B. Instructive Wording 
The words that matter most to 
the target of a Security Council resolu-
tion are typically the instructive words. 
These words indicate the amount of 
authority the Security Council intends 
to convey to the Entity of each resolu-
tion in order to make the Entity recog-
nize the severity of the Subject. The 
stronger the instructive word, the great-
er risk an Entity takes by ignoring it. If 
disregarded long enough, the Security 
Council may impose sanctions or authorize military engagement. 
The gentlest instructive word the Security Council uses is “de-
cides.” For example, the Security Council “[d]ecide[d] to extend the 
mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sa-
hara (MINURSO) until 31 January 1999.”128 “Decides” means “to solve or 
conclude (a dispute) by awarding victory to one side; to make up one’s 
mind about; resolve; to come to a decision.”129 “Decides” is different from 
other instructive words because it is the only one that does not use a direct 
object. Generally, it is used to make a statement on behalf of the Security 
Council and it often precedes other instructive words.130 It is the most com-
monly used word in Security Council resolutions, more than three thousand 
125 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 478, U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (Aug. 20, 1980) (“Censures in the 
strongest terms the enactment by Israel of the ‘basic law’ on Jerusalem and the refusal to 
comply with relevant Security Council resolutions.”). 
126 S.C. Res. 245, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/245 (Jan. 25, 1968). 
127 S.C. Res. 246, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/246 (Mar. 14, 1968). 
128 S.C. Res. 1215, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1215 (Dec. 17, 1998). 
129 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 169. 
130 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1215, supra note 128. 
Instructive Words 
From Weakest to Strongest 
Decide  
Call upon 
Recommend 
Request 
Urge 
Warn
Demand 
Table B. 
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times. Moreover, 960 resolutions conclude with the clause “decides to re-
main [actively] seized of the matter.”131 That phrase indicates that the Secu-
rity Council may return to the Subject of that resolution at a future time if 
proper actions are not taken by the appropriate Entity. 
The weakest instructive phrase that actually instructs a Entity to 
perform an action is “calls upon.” The Security Council has “[c]all[ed] upon 
all Somali parties, movements and factions to cooperate fully with the Sec-
retary-General in the implementation of [a] resolution.”132 As a phrase, 
“calls upon” is not in the dictionary, but the word “call” is defined as “to 
summon.”133 This phrase has been used 1357 times.134 In practice, when the 
Security Council “calls upon” an Entity to do something, it is asking the 
Entity to comply with that clause of the resolution simply as a matter of 
principle. Typically, the Subject of that clause of the resolution is not a ma-
jor human rights violation.135
Another gentle instructive word used by the Security Council is 
“recommends.” For example, the Security Council has “[r]ecommend[ed] 
that the United Kingdom and Albanian Governments should immediately 
refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the 
provisions of the Statute of the Court.”136 “Recommends” is defined as “to 
urge or suggest as appropriate or beneficial.”137 This word is used almost 
exclusively to make suggestions to the United Nations General Assembly,138
or to other bodies.139 The Security Council also “recommends [countries] be 
admitted to membership in the United Nations.”140
“Requests” is also a fairly mild instruction. “The Security Council 
[has] request[ed] the permanent members of the Security Council to direct 
their Chiefs of Staff to meet, or to appoint representatives who shall meet, at 
131 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1495, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1495 (July 31, 2003). 
132 S.C. Res. 746, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/746 (Mar. 17, 1992). 
133 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 93. 
134 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 746, supra note 132. 
135 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 965, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/965 (Nov. 30, 1994) (“Calls upon the 
international community to provide resources needed to meet the immediate needs of the 
Government of Rwanda directly or through the Trust Fund established pursuant to resolution 
925 . . . .”). 
136 S.C. Res. 22, U.N. Doc. S/RES/22 (Apr. 9, 1947). 
137 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 553. 
138 138 of the 180 times the word is used in a Security Council resolution. See, e.g., S.C. 
Res. 1426, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1426 (July 24, 2002) (“Recommends to the General Assembly 
that the Swiss Confederation be admitted to membership in the United Nations.”). 
139 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1012, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1012 (Aug. 28, 1995) (“Recommends 
that the international commission o inquiry be composed of five impartial and internationally 
respected, experienced jurists who shall be selected by the Secretary-General and shall be 
furnished with adequate expert staff, and the Government of Burundi be duly informed.”). 
140 S.C. Res. 374, U.N. Doc. S/RES/374 (Aug. 18, 1975). 
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London on 1 February 1946.”141 “Requests” means “to ask for; to ask 
(someone) to do something.”142 It is one of the most common instructions in 
Security Council resolutions, used 2,968 times. The actions “request[ed]” 
have varied considerably in substance, but the Security Council “requests” 
certain actions more commonly than others.143 For instance, anytime some-
thing is asked of the Secretary General, the Security Council “requests” the 
action.144
Correspondingly, when asking for something of multiple parties, 
the Security Council usually “urges” them to follow the appeal it has made. 
The Security Council has “[u]rge[d] the international community to lend its 
support to the restructuring of the security forces of the Central African 
Republic.”145 “Urges” is defined as “to push along; impel; to try to induce or 
persuade.”146 Typically, “urges” is the most definitive word the Security 
Council uses to induce an Entity’s compliance with a resolution without 
indicating excessive pressure.147
The next most strenuous instruction used by the Security Council is 
“warns.” For example, the Security Council has “[w]arn[ed] that the Coun-
cil will respond appropriately should any [Cambodian party] fail to honor its 
obligations” under prior agreements.148 “Warns” is defined as “to give ad-
vance notice to; to advise to be careful; admonish.”149 This is an apt defini-
tion in that it gives notice to a party not to engage in similar actions in the 
future while chastising that party for its current act. When the Security 
Council wants to indicate it will not tolerate future transgressions similar to 
the current Subject of its resolutions, it “warns” the Entity that repeated 
actions will be treated more harshly. The Security Council has only 
141 S.C. Res. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 (Jan. 25, 1946) 
142 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 565. 
143 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1173, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173 (June 12, 1998) (“Requests 
Member States to provide to the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), no 
later than 15 July 1998, information on the measures they have adopted to implement the 
provisions of paragraphs 11 and 12 above.”). 
144 The Security Council has “requested” an action by the Secretary-General 1564 times. 
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1167, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1167 (May 14, 1998) (“Requests the Secretary-
General to keep the Council informed of all significant developments, in particular regarding 
the security situation, and also requests him to report within three months of the adoption of 
this resolution on its implementation”). 
145 S.C. Res. 1230, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1230 (Feb. 26, 1999). 
146 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 724. 
147 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 727, U.N. Doc. S/RES/727 (Jan. 8, 1992) (“Urges all parties to 
honor the commitments made at Geneva and Sarajevo with a view to effecting a complete 
cessation of hostilities.”). 
148 S.C. Res. 826, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/826 (May 20, 1993). 
149 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 743. 
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“warned” a party seventeen times and usually only after using a strong emo-
tive word earlier in the resolution. For instance, the Security Council  
[c]ondemn[ed] the recent premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on 
Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the United 
Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions, and warn[ed] once again 
that if such attacks were to be repeated the Security Council would have to 
meet to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Char-
ter to ensure against repetition of such attacks.150
The strongest instructive word commonly used by the Security 
Council is “demands.” For example, the Security Council “[d]emand[ed] the 
immediate and total cessation of all hostile acts committed against Botswa-
na by the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia.”151 “Demands” is defined as 
“to ask for with authority; to ask for peremptorily or urgently; to call for or 
require; an urgent or pressing requirement.”152 The Security Council is not 
shy about “demanding” action; it has “demanded” an action 805 times. 
Most commonly, “demands” is used to instruct the Entity or Entities of a 
resolution to cease hostilities or fighting.153
C. Modifiers  
The Security Council often uses modifying adverbs to increase the 
intensity of an emotive word.154 Examples include “deeply,”155 “gravely,”156
“solemnly,”157 “strongly,”158 “urgently,”159 and “vigorously.”160 The most 
common modifier, other than no modifier, is the term “strongly,” used 371 
times. The least common modifier is “vigorously,” which is used only three 
times, each in conjunction with the term “condemn.”161 Although modifiers 
150 S.C. Res. 265, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/265 (Apr. 1, 1969) (emphasis added). 
151 S.C. Res. 403, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/403 (Jan. 14, 1977). 
152 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 173. 
153 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1304, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1304 (June 16, 2000) (“Demands that 
Ugandan and Rwandan forces as well as forces of the Congolese armed opposition and other 
armed groups immediately and completely withdraw from Kisangani.”). 
154 See Safire, supra note 90. 
155 “[I]ntense; profound.” WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 170. 
156 “[S]edate or solemn; weighty; momentous; serious; critical.” Id. at 288. 
157 “[G]rave; mirthless; serious; earnest.” Id. at 630. 
158 “[P]owerful in influence; of great force, effectiveness, or potency.” Id. at 655. 
159 “[R]equiring immediate action or attention.” Id. at 724. 
160 “[A]ctive strength or force; intensity.” Id. at 734. 
161 S.C. Res. 612, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/612 (May 9, 1988) (“Condemns vigorously the 
continued use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Iraq contrary to the obligations under the Geneva Protocol.”); S.C. Res. 611, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
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play a small role in this content analysis, they serve an important role by 
incrementally increasing the intensity of a word without requiring the Secu-
rity Council to use the next strongest emotive word in the hierarchical sys-
tem.162
V. THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S DISPARATE TREATMENT OF ENTITIES
A. Two Distinct Time Periods 
Since the Security Council began considering threats to internation-
al peace and security in 1946, the Council has not consistently performed its 
task, nor has it used wording in resolutions evenly. The history of the Secu-
rity Council can easily be split into two distinct periods: Cold War and post-
Cold War.163 During the Cold War period, due to the veto possessed by both 
the United States and the Soviet Union, many “challenges to international 
peace and security” were not addressed by the Security Council, including 
the Berlin Blockade, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Prague Spring, and the 
Vietnam War.164 Each of these Subjects involved either the United States or 
the Soviet Union. Since neither country would allow itself to be criticized 
by the Security Council, each one vetoed resolutions regarding any of these 
Subjects, despite the threat to international peace and security each pre-
sented.165 Since each Permanent Member had veto power, the Security 
Council was usually confined to “operating on the margins of the major 
conflicts of its time, often intervening to encourage negotiation, to streng-
then cease-fires and to deploy monitors and impartial peacekeeping 
forces.”166 From 1946 to 1989, only 646 Security Council resolutions were 
issued.167 The Security Council never issued more than thirty resolutions in 
a single year before 1990.168
S/RES/611 (Apr. 25, 1988) (“Condemns vigorously the aggression, perpetrated on 16 April 
1988 against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Tunisia in flagrant violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations, international law and norms of conduct.”); S.C. Res. 573, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985) (“Condemns vigorously the act of armed aggression 
perpetrated by Israel against Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations, international law and norms of conduct.”). 
162 For an illustration of the increase in strength associated with adding the word “strongly” 
to an emotive word, see Safire, supra note 90. 
163 Malone, supra note 48, at 117. 
164 Id. at 120. 
165 See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
374–75 (7th ed., Routledge 1997) (1970).
166 Malone, supra note 48, at 117. 
167 See S.C. Res. 646, U.N. Doc. S/RES/646 (Dec. 14, 1989). 
168 Peter Wallensteen & Patrik Johansson, Security Council Decisions in Perspective in
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 17, 18 (David M. 
Malone ed., 2004). 
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Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War, the Security Council was freed from its shackles and able to consider 
more issues while using different word choices.169 Since 1990, the Security 
Council has issued more than 1,100 resolutions.170 The vocabulary of the 
Security Council has changed in the post-Cold War period. Some words 
have not been used by the Security Council in resolutions in the post-Cold 
War period, such as “grieved” or “censure,” which have not been used since 
1986. Other words, such as “alarmed” or “concerned,” are used more fre-
quently in the current time period. Additionally, the breakup of the Soviet 
Union had a ripple effect on many other countries in Eastern Europe.171 For 
example, the fragmentation of Yugoslavia led to conflicts between warring 
factions that has killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions from 
their homes.172 The Security Council, free from the constant threat or use of 
a veto by a Permanent Member, “displayed an unprecedented activism” in 
trying to facilitate peace and security.173 Table C shows the dramatically 
different usage of the Permanent Member veto in the two distinct eras.174
169 See Ken Roberts, Second-Guessing the Security Council: The International Court of 
Justice and its Powers of Judicial Review, 7 PACE INT’L L. REV. 281, 282 (1995). 
170 See S.C. Res. 1784, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1784 (Oct. 31, 2007). 
171 See Roger Cohen, End of Cold War Offers Chilling New Dangers, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Nov. 26, 1994, at A15.
172 Id. 
173 Roberts, supra note 169, at 283. 
174 Malone, supra note 48, at 121. 
Figure 2. 
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This Note uses the start of 1990 as the split between the two eras 
due to the drastic change in productivity evidenced by the increased number 
of Security Council resolutions.176 The majority of statistics invoked in this 
analysis pertains to the Cold War era, when the polarized Security Council 
focused extensively on Israel—and to a lesser extent South Africa—while 
failing to address most other conflicts.  
175 Malone, supra note 48, at 121. 
176 Prior to 1990, the Security Council never published more than twenty-nine resolutions 
in any year. From 1990 to 2007, the Security Council averaged more than sixty-three resolu-
tions each year, with a range between thirty-seven and ninety-three resolutions per year. For 
graphical depiction of the increase in Security Council resolutions, see Figure 2. 
Table C. 1946-1986 1987-2005175
Resolutions 593 1010
   Percentage of total 37 63 
Vetoes 212 38
   Percentage of total 85 15 
Vetoes by country 
   USSR/Russia 114 3 
   USA 54 26
   UK 25 5 
   France 16 2
   China 3 2 
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Since the creation of the United Nations, Israel’s actions have been 
the Subject of far more resolutions than any other Subject. Prior to 1990, 
147 Security Council resolutions dealt with Israel and its actions, which was 
more than twenty-three percent of the 646 resolutions issued during that 
time frame.177 South Africa was the second most popular Entity referred to 
in resolutions during the Cold War era, considered in seventy-six resolu-
tions. Of the 646 resolutions of the period, ninety-two merely discussed the 
admission of new Members to the United Nations.178 Numerous others 
served merely house-keeping purposes.179 These proportions are graphically 
displayed in Figure 3. In the post-Cold War era, resolutions concerning 
Israel have dropped to less than seven percent of the resolutions issued. Si-
milarly, South Africa was rarely addressed by the Security Council after the 
Cold War era because apartheid was already in decline by the end of the 
1980s.180 The drastic difference between the two time periods indicates that, 
in addition to the Security Council failing to treat its Members equally, it 
does not even treat specific Members the same over time. 
177 For graphical breakdown of Security Council resolutions in the Cold War era, see Fig-
ure 3. 
178 Ninety-two resolutions considered admitting new Members, but Security Council Reso-
lution 69 discussed the admission of Israel S.C. Res. 69, U.N. Doc. S/RES/69 (Mar. 4, 1949). 
In order to use conservative calculations, which further emphasizes the disparity, Security 
Council Resolution 69 was not counted among the 147 Israel-centric resolutions of the Cold 
War era, despite the fact that it related to the State of Israel. 
179 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 110, U.N. Doc S/RES/110 (Dec. 16., 1955) (stating that, according 
to the Charter, the United Nations must hold a conference to review the United Nations Char-
ter).
180 South Africa’s election of F.W. de Klerk as President and his negotiation with Nelson 
Mandela began the process of “dismantl[ing] the legislative basis for apartheid.” GORMAN,
supra note 24, at 130. 
Figure 3. 
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B. Entity-Specific Word Choices 
1.  The Hebron massacre v. the Park Hotel bombing 
The Security Council does not have a uniform vocabulary; it has 
used distinct words in resolutions regarding specific Entities. Comparing the 
distinct word choices in Security Council Resolution 904 with Security 
Council Resolution 1,402 is the most telling demonstration of the Council’s 
proclivity for treating Israel differently than other Entities.181 In 1994, Ba-
ruch Goldstein, a Jewish settler living in the Occupied Territories of the 
West Bank, entered the Mosque of Ibrahim in the city of Hebron and killed 
twenty-nine Muslims while they were praying.182 Another 125 Muslims 
were wounded in the gruesome attack.183 The mayor of Hebron, Mustafa 
Natshe, acknowledged that Goldstein had acted alone.184 Furthermore, the 
Israeli government explicitly denounced his actions and declared his politi-
cal party,185 Kach, to be an illegal, racist party in Israel.186 The Security 
Council “strongly condemn[ed]” the “massacre” in Hebron and “call[ed] 
upon” Israel to prevent these types of illegal acts.187 The Security Council 
used the term “massacre” five times to describe the tragic incident.188
By contrast, in 2002, a Palestinian from the West Bank entered an 
Israeli hotel during a Passover religious ceremony and set off a bomb.189
The explosion killed at least twenty-nine Jewish worshippers and injured an 
additional 140 patrons in the Park Hotel.190 Hamas, a Palestinian political 
party, explicitly claimed credit for the attack.191 The Security Council re-
181 See S.C. Res. 904, U.N. Doc. S/RES/904 (Mar. 18, 1994); S.C. Res. 1402, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1402 (Mar. 30, 2002). 
182 LESCH, supra note 25, at 331. 
183 David Weisburd & Hagit Lernau, What Prevented Violence in Jewish Settlements in the 
Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip: Toward a Perspective of Normative Balance, 22 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 48 (2006). See also Clyde Haberman, Israel Panel Says Killer at Hebron 
was Acting Alone, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1994, at A1. However, the Israeli army contends 
only ninety were wounded. Id.
184 Id.
185 LESCH, supra note 25, at 331. 
186 See Weisburd & Lemau, supra note 182, at 48–49. 
187 S.C. Res. 904, supra note 180. 
188 Id.
189 Tracy Wilkinson, Attack in Israel Kills 19, Hurts 100; Violence: Palestinian Suicide 
Bombing, the Deadliest in 10 Months, Could End Efforts for a Cease-fire and Unleash a New 
Phase in the Conflict, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002, at A1. 
190 John Ward Anderson & Molly Moore, 38 Hurt as Suicide Bomb Rocks Netanya Again,
WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2003, at A25. See also Greg Myre, A Passover Anniversary, Observed 
by the Maimed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at A3. 
191 Wilkinson, supra note 188, at A1; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ERASED IN A MOMENT:
SUICIDE BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI CIVILIANS 146 (2002). 
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sponded with a resolution that “express[ed] its grave concern” about both 
the suicide bombing and Israel’s attacks against the Palestinian Authority.192
It “call[ed] upon” Israel and the Palestinians to uphold a ceasefire and spe-
cifically “call[ed] for the withdrawal of Israel troops from Palestinian ci-
ties.”193
The differences in wording used by the Security Council in the two 
resolutions are striking. Similar numbers of casualties and wounded wor-
shippers were found in each incident, yet only Resolution 904 explicitly 
“condemn[ed]” an attack and repeatedly used the term “massacre.”194 If 
twenty-nine casualties and more than 125 wounded are defined as a “massa-
cre” of Palestinian worshippers, should not the same hold true of Israeli 
worshipers? Apparently it does not in the Security Council. The Council 
“strongly condemn[ed]” the massacre in Hebron,195 yet it merely “call[ed] 
upon” the parties to uphold a ceasefire and did not explicitly mention the 
Park Hotel bombing or casualties incurred.196 Resolution 904 specifically 
refers to the Palestinian civilian casualties four times in the resolution,197 but 
Resolution 1402 does not mention Israeli civilians or casualties even 
once.198 Additionally, Resolution 904 unambiguously characterizes the vic-
tims as “worshippers” killed “during the holy month of Ramadan,”199 which 
clearly aligns the victims with the entire Islamic world. Resolution 1402 
fails to mention who was killed by the “recent suicide bombings in Israel” 
and completely omits that the Park Hotel bombing was perpetrated on un-
suspecting worshippers celebrating Passover.200 A comparison of the expli-
cit details and descriptions in Resolution 904 with the vague generalities in 
Resolution 1402 clearly demonstrates the Security Council’s discrepant 
treatment of the two similar Subjects. 
Second, Resolution 904 declares the “massacre” resulted in “more 
than 50 Palestinian civilians [deaths] and injured several hundred others.”201
These statistics are notably inaccurate. Numerous reports of the massacre 
have capped the casualties at twenty-nine, with another 125 wounded.202
192 S.C. Res. 1402, supra note 180. 
193 Id. 
194 S.C. Res. 904, supra note 180. 
195 Id.
196 S.C. Res. 1402, supra note 180. 
197 S.C. Res. 904, supra note 180. 
198 S.C. Res. 1402, supra note 180. 
199 S.C. Res. 904, supra note 180. 
200 S.C. Res. 1402, supra note 180. 
201 S.C. Res. 904, supra note 180 (emphasis added). 
202 Haberman, supra note 182, at A1. See also Weisburd & Lemau, supra note 182, at 48; 
Scott Wilson, In Divided Hebron, a Shared Despair: Palestinians and Jewish Settlers in 
West Bank City Struggle for Existence, WASH. POST, July 26, 2007, at A18. 
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Nevertheless, when the Security Council addressed the Park Hotel bombing 
in Resolution 1402, it neglected to include a single statistic or approxima-
tion of the Israeli victims. The extreme inflation of numbers in Resolution 
904 compared to the complete absence of details in Resolution 1402 only 
serves to emphasize the disparate word choices by the Security Council 
when addressing Israel versus other Entities. 
Finally, the Security Council fails to take into account the aftermath 
of these tragic incidents. Following the “massacre” in Hebron, the Israeli 
government immediately denounced the rogue citizen. Furthermore it took 
measures to outlaw his fringe political party due to its radical ideologies.203
With respect to the Park Hotel bombing, the suicide bomber’s political par-
ty, Hamas, not only failed to chastise the brutal attack, but it proudly 
claimed credit for killing and maiming Israelis. The Security Council ig-
nored these distinctions between the two attacks, further proving that even 
when Subjects are virtually identical, if Israel is one of the Entities, it will 
be treated differently. 
2.  Precise numbers and civilians 
The differences evident in Security Council Resolution 904 and 
Resolution 1402—one that includes detailed, inaccurate numbers and the 
other mere vague generalities—is not isolated to these two tragic incidents. 
The Security Council repeatedly uses remarkable detail in discussing the 
actions Israel has exacted upon other Entities. In at least eight resolutions, 
the Security Council has declared the precise number of people killed, de-
ported or injured by Israel.204 These eight resolutions do not even include 
the additional resolutions that use detailed, but inexact amounts, such as 
“hundreds,”205 “unknown number of deaths and destruction,”206 or “a high 
number of deaths and injuries.”207 Moreover, the term “Palestinian civilian” 
has been used thirty-three times in Security Council resolutions to describe 
the people being subjected to inappropriate actions.208 Not a single time in 
1794 Security Council resolutions has the Council used the specific term 
203 See Weisburd & Lemau, supra note 182, at 49 n.42 (quoting Samuel C. Heilman, 
Guides of the Faithful: Contemporary Religious Zionist Rabbis, in SPOKESMEN FOR THE 
DESPISED: FUNDAMENTALIST LEADERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST 328, 355–356 (R. Scott Appleby 
ed., 1997)). 
204 S.C. Res. 1322, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1322 (Oct. 7, 2000); S.C. Res. 904, supra note 180; 
S.C. Res. 726, U.N. Doc. S/RES/726 (Jan. 6, 1992); S.C. Res. 694, U.N. Doc. S/RES/694 
(May 24, 1991); S.C. Res. 681, supra note 25; S.C. Res. 672, supra note 111; S.C. Res. 641, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/641 (Aug. 30, 1989); S.C. Res. 636, U.N. Doc. S/RES/636 (July 6, 1989). 
205 S.C. Res. 799, U.N. Doc. S/RES/799 (Dec. 18, 1992). 
206 S.C. Res. 1405, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1405 (Apr. 19, 2002). 
207 S.C. Res. 1073, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1073 (Sep. 28, 1996). 
208 See, e.g., id. 
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“Israeli civilian,” especially intriguing considering suicide bombers usually 
target Israeli civilians.209
Outside the scope of the Middle East conflict, precise details or 
numbers are extremely rare. For example, the Security Council first consi-
dered South Africa’s apartheid practices in 1960 when sixty-nine unarmed 
African protestors were killed by the government and another two hundred 
were injured, in what is known as the “Sharpeville incident.”210 The casual-
ties and wounded protestors were well documented and resulted in a com-
plaint to the Security Council by twenty-nine Members.211 Even with clear 
documentation and the outrage of so many Members, Security Council Res-
olution 134 failed to use any specific details in describing the tragic inci-
dent.212 Instead, the Council described the Sharpeville incident as “large-
scale killings of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators against racial discrim-
ination.”213 This serves as another example that, even amongst pariah 
states,214 the Security Council does not treat all Members equally. 
3.  Black September, al-Anfal, and the West Bank 
The Security Council’s issuance of resolutions against Israel for ac-
tions it would ignore if made by another Entity can be verified by examin-
ing the treatment of other Middle Eastern countries in the Cold War era, 
specifically Jordan and Iraq. In September of 1970, King Hussein of Jordan 
sought to bolster his power over his people by eliminating the influence of 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and driving the group from 
his country.215 Hussein treated “the PLO with extreme harshness, killing 
thousands in two weeks.”216 Over three thousand were killed in the brutal 
expulsion of the PLO.217 As a result of the King’s offensive, the PLO was 
209 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 190, at passim. For a brief description of many 
terrorist attacks since 2001, see Anti-Defamation League, Major Terrorist Attacks in Israel,
http://www.adl.org/Israel/israel_attacks.asp.
210 OZDEMIR A. OZGUR, APARTHEID: THE UNITED NATIONS & PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 99 (1982); GORMAN, supra note 24, at 127. 
211 S.C. Res. 134, U.N. Doc. S/RES/134 (Apr. 1, 1960). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 During the Cold War period, Israel and South Africa were often referred to as pariah 
states in the international community. See Frits Kalshoven, Grotius: His Relevance to 
Present Day Law of Armed Conflict, 77 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 212, 234 (1983). 
215 ALEXANDER BLIGH, THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF KING HUSSEIN 138 (2002). 
216 YAACOV LOZOWICK, RIGHT TO EXIST: A MORAL DEFENSE OF ISRAEL’S WARS 146 (Anc-
hor Books 2004) (2003); see also EFRAIM KARSH, ARAFAT’S WAR 28 (2003) (declaring thou-
sands dead and “horrendous atrocities” carried out). 
217 LESCH, supra note 25, at 235. 
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“crushed and driven out of Jordan”218 and the entire PLO infrastructure was 
evicted by 1971.219 This tragic event is referred to as Black September.220
With the PLO no longer a factor, Hussein remained King until his death in 
1999.221
Despite the well documented maltreatment of Palestinians living in 
Jordan during Black September, the Security Council failed to issue a single 
resolution or condemnation of the “horrendous atrocities.”222 Perhaps the 
Security Council tacitly permitted these vicious actions due to America’s 
Permanent Member veto. The United States invested quite a bit in King 
Hussein’s control of Jordan. In fact, “Hussein’s moves during September 
1970 were taken in concert with the US.” 223 Soon after Black September, 
America intensified its military cooperation with the King and even sta-
tioned a CIA representative in Jordan’s capital.224 The fact that America 
may have played a role in coordinating the King’s crackdown on his own 
people—or at least giving him its tacit approval—may partially explain the 
absence of any Security Council resolutions on this matter. Additionally, the 
fact that the PLO was an organization that both encouraged and sponsored 
worldwide terrorism surely played a role in the Council’s moral justification 
of the persecution.225
In Iraq, the Security Council failed to chastise Saddam Hussein, or 
even produce a single resolution, for the horrific al-Anfal campaign against 
his own Iraqi citizens. From 1987 to 1988, Saddam’s forces used chemical 
weapons to kill an estimated 182,000 Kurdish persons living in Iraq.226
Another 140,000 were forcefully removed from their homes.227 Although 
Saddam was charged with genocide by the Iraqi High Tribunal two decades 
218 LIBRARY OF CONG. FED. RESEARCH DIV., JORDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 64 (Helen Chapin 
Metz ed., 1991). 
219 LESCH, supra note 25, at 236. 
220 Id. at 235. The name of Jordan’s civil war should not be confused with the organization 
“Black September” which was responsible for killing eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich 
Olympics as well as numerous other plane hijackings. Id. at 238.  
221 BLIGH, supra note 214, at 1. 
222 KARSH, supra note 215, at 28.
223 BLIGH, supra note 214, at 141. 
224 Id. at 142.  
225 SCHOENBERG, supra note 15, at 31–33. 
226 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Events Leading to the Creation of the IHT in SADDAM ON TRIAL
10 (Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal eds., 2006) (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH &
PHYSICIANS, IRAQI KURDISTAN: THE DESTRUCTION OF KOREME DURING THE ANFAL 
CAMPAIGN (1993); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST THE KURDS (1993)).
227 Id. (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ASSAULT ON THE MARSH 
ARABS (2003)).
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after the carnage,228 the Security Council never addressed Saddam’s crimes 
against humanity in a resolution. The United States never officially vetoed a 
resolution chastising Saddam’s actions against his own people, but America 
is, most likely, the reason for the absence of a Security Council resolution. 
During the 1980s, the United States knowingly supplied Iraq with chemicals 
to use against Iran in the war between those two countries.229 The United 
States’ covert policy—providing Iraq with chemicals that could be used as 
weapons in order to maintain the balance of fighting—was grounded in pre-
venting both the destabilization of the entire Middle East and the flow of oil 
to America.230 After Saddam used those same chemical weapons against his 
own people, it is doubtful the United States would permit an international 
condemnation of war crimes committed with the weapons America had 
supplied. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Security Council has ignored these 
horrific massacres, Israel has been repeatedly condemned and criticized for 
killing and/or deporting Palestinians.231 Each occurrence for which Israel 
has been denounced involved far less than the three thousand killed during 
Black September or the 182,000 slaughtered in Iraq. Israel has been “dep-
lored” for deporting “four Palestinians”232 and “five Palestinians.”233 It has 
been “[s]trongly condemn[ed]” for deporting “twelve Palestinian[s]”234 and 
“hundreds of Palestinian[s].”235 Israel was also “condemn[ed]” by the Secu-
rity Council for violence “resulting in over twenty Palestinian deaths.”236
These statistics are not offered as a defense of Israel’s actions, but each of 
these figures pale in comparison to the numbers attributed to Black Septem-
ber or the al-Anfal Campaign, yet only Israel is chastised in Security Coun-
cil resolutions. 
228 Paul von Zielbauer, Kurds Tell of Gas Attacks by Hussein’s Military, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
23, 2006, at A10. Saddam was executed before the trial completed, but five co-defendants 
were convicted, proving that the al-Anfal campaign was genocide. See John F. Burns, Hus-
sein’s Cousin Sentenced to Die for Kurd Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2007, at A1. 
229 Russ W. Baker, Iraqgate: The Big One That (Almost) Got Away, Who Chased It – and 
Who Didn’t, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.–Apr. 1993, at 48, 49–50; Michael Dobbs, U.S.
Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup: Trade in Chemical Arms Allowed Despite Their Use on Ira-
nians, Kurds, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2002, at A1. 
230 Baker, supra note 228, at 48; Dobbs, supra note 228, at A1. 
231 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 450, U.N. Doc. S/RES/450 (June 14, 1979). 
232 S.C. Res. 681, supra note 25.
233 S.C. Res. 641, supra note 203. 
234 S.C. Res. 726, supra note 203. 
235 S.C. Res. 799, supra note 204. 
236 S.C. Res. 672, supra note 111, ¶¶ 1–2. 
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4.  South Africa: The other pariah state 
While Israel was clearly the most commonly singled out Entity in 
Security Council resolutions of the Cold War era, it was not the only one. 
South Africa’s actions were the Subject of seventy-six Security Council 
resolutions in the Cold War era.237 These resolutions concerned South Afri-
ca’s apartheid practices,238 or military attacks on other countries, such as 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, and Zambia.239 Apartheid was South Africa’s 
“strict policy of racial separation and discrimination” by which the minority 
white population controlled the government and the non-white majority.240
Although apartheid is a horrific subjugation of human rights that violates 
the United Nations Charter,241 South Africa was excessively chastised com-
pared with atrocities perpetrated by other Entities. Stanley Meisler, two time 
winner of the Korn-Ferry Award for Excellence in United Nations Reports, 
asserted that: 
[t]he U.N. blathered on day after day about the terrible injustice of South 
Africa but closed its eyes to horrors like the enervating civil war and the 
legions of bloated Biafran babies in Nigeria, the blatant genocide of the 
Hutus in Burundi, and the unabashed evil of a cunning and cruel Idi Amin 
in Uganda. These blights were at least as terrible as that of South Africa.242
The Security Council’s failure to chastise these, as well as many 
other, atrocities directly conflicts with the principle of equal treatment for 
all Members, which was expressed in the introduction to the United Nations 
Charter.
237 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 310, U.N. Doc. S/RES/310 (Feb. 4, 1972). 
238 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 191, supra note 108. 
239 Peter-Tobias Stoll, Conflicts, South Africa, in 1 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND 
PRACTICE 317, 325 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 1995). See, e.g., S.C. Res. 300, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/300 (Oct. 12, 1971).  
240 Stoll, supra note 238, at 317. 
241 The Charter declares that there must be a “respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” U.N. Charter art. 
1, para. 3. 
242 MEISLER, supra note 46, at x. 
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Not only did the Security Council excessively criticize South Afri-
ca, but it often used stronger words to criticize South Africa’s actions than 
any other Entity, including Israel. South Africa was more vulnerable to 
harsh denunciation and extensive focus because it lacked a staunch, Perma-
nent Member ally on the Security Council willing to consistently veto reso-
lutions regarding its transgressions. South Africa was passively supported 
by WEOG, but “it never had such an indispensable ally as Israel did with 
the United States.”243 In the Cold War era, South Africa was “condemn[ed]” 
107 times.244 It was “condemn[ed]” more often than every other Entity 
combined, including Israel.245
Other than Israel, which was 
“condemn[ed]” thirty-seven times 
in the Cold War era, no other 
Entity was “condemn[ed]” more 
than ten times. South Africa’s 
apartheid policy and military at-
tacks, as a Member of the United 
Nations, were an obvious stain on 
the United Nations as an organiza-
tion; however, the astronomical 
discrepancy of “condemn[ations]” by the Security Council shows that the 
Council did not treat other Entities with equal attention or severity of word-
ing.246       
The Security Council “condemn[ations]” of South Africa were not 
the only word choice that was used far more frequently for South Africa 
than any other Entity. The Security Council “demand[ed]” an action from 
South Africa seventy-seven times in the Cold War era.247 Often the “de-
mands” required South Africa to withdraw forces from other territories,248
respect another country’s sovereignty,249 or make payment for damage to 
other countries.250 Once again, many of these actions are indefensible and 
243 Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Exclusion from Participation in International Organisa-
tions: The Law and Practice behind Member States’ Expulsion and Suspension of Member-
ship in 5 STUDIES AND MATERIALS ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 224 
(Peter Malanczuk ed., 2001) (citing Robert C. Johansen, The Reagan Administration and the 
U.N.: The Costs of Unilateralism, 3 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL 601, 607–608 (1986)). 
244 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 301, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/301 (Oct. 20, 1971). 
245 South Africa was “condemn[ed]” 107 times and every other country combined was 
“condemn[ed]” a total of eighty-nine times. 
246 See MEISLER, supra note 46, at x. 
247 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 277, U.N. Doc. S/RES/277 (Mar. 18, 1970). 
248 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 567, U.N. Doc. S/RES/567 (June 20, 1985). 
249 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 387, U.N. Doc. S/RES/387 (Mar. 31, 1976). 
250 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 527, U.N. Doc. S/RES/527 (Dec. 15, 1982). 
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should be criticized; however, the unambiguous inequality of usage of the 
word “demand” in Security Council resolutions concerning South Africa is 
too great to attribute merely to South Africa’s actions rather than unequal 
treatment of Entities. 
5.  Warnings: The domain of Israel and South Africa 
During the Cold War era, at the United Nations, Israel and South 
Africa were often “lumped” together.251 The Security Council almost exclu-
sively reserved its “warn[ings]” for Israel and South Africa.252 The Security 
Council repetitively “warn[ed]” each of the two countries that if military 
attacks were repeated, the Council would consider further steps to enforce 
its resolutions.253 In the Cold War era, Israel and South Africa were each 
given five “warn[ings].” The only other Entity “warn[ed]” in this manner 
was Portugal.254
Many other military attacks have failed to produce a “warn[ing]” 
from the Security Council. On October 6, 1973, the holiest day of the year 
for Israel, “Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack against Israel.”255
These military attacks never produced a “warn[ing]” from the Security 
Council. When the Security Council considered Indonesia’s intervention in 
East Timor in the 1970s, a conflict which resulted in more than 60,000 
deaths,256 the Council did not “warn” Indonesia.257 During the Iran-Iraq War 
of the 1980s, the Security Council failed to “warn” either country despite 
repeated military attacks against each other’s civilian populations.258 Even 
with ample records of numerous military attacks by many Entities other 
than Israel and South Africa, the Security Council reserves its “warn[ings]” 
for those two countries. 
251 MEISLER, supra note 46, at 182. 
252 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 439, U.N. Doc. S/RES/439 (Nov. 13, 1978). 
253 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 280, U.N. Doc. S/RES/280 (May 19, 1970). Despite this threat, the 
Security Council never followed with any form of binding resolution to impose sanctions or 
worse. 
254 Portugal was warned twice. S.C. Res. 290, U.N. Doc. S/RES/290 (Dec. 8, 1970); S.C. 
Res. 275, U.N. Doc. S/RES/275 (Dec. 22, 1969).
255 LIBRARY OF CONG. FED. RESEARCH DIV., ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY 64 (Helen Chapin 
Metz ed., 1990). 
256 Paul D. Elliott, The East Timor Dispute, 27 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 238, 238 (1978). 
257 S.C. Res. 389, U.N. Doc. S/RES/389 (Apr. 22, 1976); S.C. Res. 384, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/384 (Dec. 22, 1975). 
258 For a thorough description of many of these military attacks, see CAMERON R. HUME,
THE UNITED NATIONS, IRAN, AND IRAQ: HOW PEACEMAKING CHANGED 42–52 (1994). 
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6. Censure: Reserved for Israel 
The Security Council has not used the word “censure” since the 
Cold War era, and it has “censure[d]” an Entity only seven times in its his-
tory, yet Israel’s actions have been the Subject of five of those seven resolu-
tions.259 Resolution 267 refers to Israel’s attempts to change the demograph-
ics of the population in Jerusalem and incorporate the newly occupied city 
into Israel proper by administrative measures such as settlements.260 The 
Security Council “[c]ensure[d] in the strongest terms all measures taken to 
change the status of the City of Jerusalem.”261
However, in 1990, when Iraq destroyed Kuwaiti demographic 
records and expelled Kuwaiti citizens from the region, the Security Council 
failed to “censure” Iraq, instead it “[c]ondemn[ed]” the actions.262 The exile 
of citizens in conjunction with destroying records of their habitation—along 
with taking hostages and seizing property—are a far more devious combina-
tion of acts than transporting citizens into occupied lands because the for-
mer eliminates any prospect of reversal.  
After examining the seven Security Council censures, it appears 
that as a prerequisite, the Entity must have been previously chastised on the 
same Subject. Since an Entity has already been, in effect, warned to stop its 
actions, it follows that the Security Council can justify using the harsher 
language and censure the Entity for repeating its actions. Israel satisfied the 
precondition as it was previously instructed by the Security Council to cease 
its efforts to change the legal status of Jerusalem through administrative 
measures in Resolution 252.263
With respect to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and its appalling actions, 
Resolution 674 was not the Security Council’s only condemnation of Iraq. 
Only a month later, in Resolution 677, the Security Council reiterated its 
criticism of Iraq’s actions, but it still did not increase the strength of the 
wording to “censure;” instead, it merely “[c]ondemn[ed]” Iraq again.264
Iraq’s repeated disregard of Security Council resolutions satisfied the cru-
259 S.C. Res. 517, supra note 117; S.C. Res. 478, supra note 125; S.C. Res. 267, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/267 (July 3, 1969); S.C. Res. 228, supra note 121; S.C. Res. 101, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/101 (Nov. 24, 1953). 
260 See S.C. Res. 267, supra note 258. 
261 Id.
262 S.C. Res. 674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (Oct. 29, 1990) (“Condemning the actions by the 
Iraqi authorities and occupying forces to take third-State nationals hostage and to mistreat 
and oppress Kuwaiti and third-State nationals, and the other action reported to the Council, 
such as the destruction of Kuwaiti demographic records, the forced departure of Kuwaitis, 
the relocation of population in Kuwait and the unlawful destruction and seizure of public and 
private property in Kuwait, including hospital supplies and equipment.”). 
263 S.C. Res. 252, U.N. Doc. S/RES/252 (May 21, 1968). 
264 S.C. Res. 677, U.N. Doc. S/RES/677 (Nov. 28, 1990). 
2009] U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 505
cial element of previous chastisement on the Subject, yet a “censure” was 
never invoked. These two situations, one involving Israel and the other Iraq, 
are factually analogous enough to demonstrate that other Entities are not 
criticized with the same language as Israel. 
7.  Deplored: Israel more than every other country combined 
Another word the Security Council used for Israel far more com-
monly than other Entities during the Cold War era is the word “deplore[d].” 
Israel was “deplore[d]” forty times by the Security Council before 1990.265
The Entity “deplore[d]” the second most regularly during this time period 
was South Africa, with eight occurrences.266 In fact, Israel alone was “dep-
lore[d]” more often than every other Entity combined.267 Perhaps the Secu-
rity Council has “deplore[d]” Israel so frequently because, although it is a 
charged and scolding word, it is relatively weaker than other emotive words, 
which may make it easier to get past the United States veto.268
Moreover, another reason Israel is “deplored” so often may be that 
Israel’s policies in the West Bank and Gaza have created a bias in the Secu-
rity Council that encourages the Council to “deplore” virtually any action by 
Israel, even if that action would not be discussed if perpetrated by another 
Entity.269 Israel has been “deplored” for a range of topics including the fol-
lowing: “lack of co-operation” with a United Nations security force,270 its 
decision to prohibit the free travel of Mayor Fahd Qawasmeh,271 holding a 
military parade in Jerusalem,272 refusing to receive the mission of the Secre-
tary-General to the region,273 its military incursions,274 and failing to comply 
265 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 248, U.N. Doc. S/RES/248 (Mar. 24, 1968) (“Deplor[ing] all violent 
incidents in violation of the cease-fire.”). 
266 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 134, supra note 210 (“Deplor[ing] the policies and actions of the 
Government of the Union of South Africa which have given rise to the present situation.”). 
267 Israel was “deplor[ed]” forty times and every other country combined was “deplor[ed]” 
a total of thirty-eight times, including South Africa’s eight. 
268 See Bernard D. Nossiter, U.N. Assails Israelis over Bomb Attacks that Maimed Arabs,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1980, at A1 (discussing how certain words must be weakened or elimi-
nated to get past the United State’s veto). 
269 Cf. Michla Pomerance, Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory: The ICJ's Advisory Jurisdiction and the Crumbling Wall 
Between The Political and the Judicial, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 26, 34–35 (2005) (discussing the 
U.N. double standard in Israel-related matters). 
270 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 444, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/444 (Jan. 19, 1979). 
271 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 465, U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (Mar. 1, 1980). 
272 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 251, U.N. Doc. S/RES/251 (May 2, 1968). 
273 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 673, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/673 (Oct. 24, 1990). 
274 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 248, supra note 264. 
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with previous Security Council resolutions.275 Other Entities are typically 
“deplored” for casualties caused by military attacks,276 or rejecting prior 
Security Council resolutions.277 While it is not evident that Israel being 
“deplored” is in itself a more harsh word, it further buttresses the fact that 
Israel is treated differently. 
8.  Shocked: A comparison of assassinations 
Another word the Security Council uses frequently in resolutions 
regarding Israel is “shocked.”278 This word has only been used in eight reso-
lutions in the history of the Security Council, but Israel’s actions were the 
Subject of four of them.279 Most interesting is Security Council Resolution 
471, which states that the Security Council is “[s]hocked by the assassina-
tion attempts against the Mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh.”280 On 
June 5, 1980, three separate bombs injured two Arab mayors and an Israeli 
soldier protecting another Arab mayor, but no one died in the attacks.281
Although the Israeli government played no role in the bombings and the 
army tried to defuse one of the bombs, the Security Council voted fourteen 
to zero, with an abstention from the United States, to condemn Israel for the 
attacks.282
In responding to a different assassination attempt, this one made by 
Ethiopians on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the Security Council 
instead used the word “alarmed” to describe its feelings.283 Mubarak was 
driving to the opening of the African summit meeting when the attackers 
ambushed the motorcade with automatic weapons.284 Remarkably, Mubarak 
was not injured in the attack.285 In Security Council Resolution 1044, Ethi-
opia was in no way blamed for the attack and Sudan was simply “call[ed] 
upon” to extradite three suspects that it was harboring.286 The wording in 
275 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 298, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/298 (Sept. 25, 1971). 
276 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 189, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/189 (June 4, 1964). 
277 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 218, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/218 (Nov. 23, 1965). 
278 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 517, supra note 117 (“Deeply shocked and alarmed by the deplora-
ble consequences of the Israeli invasion of Beirut.”). 
279 This includes Security Council Resolution 57, which does not mention Israel by name, 
but the Subject of the resolution is the death of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, 
Count Folke Bernadotte, who was killed by a Jewish group called the Stern Gang. MEISLER,
supra note 46, at 51. 
280 S.C. Res. 471, supra note 116. 
281 See Nossiter, supra note 267, at A1. 
282 See id.
283 S.C. Res. 1044, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1044 (Jan. 31, 1996). 
284 Chris Hedges, Egyptian Leader Survives Attack, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1995, at A1. 
285 Id.
286 S.C. Res. 1044, ¶ 4(a), supra note 282.  
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Resolution 1044, although describing an attempt on a President rather than 
just Mayors, was less severe than Resolution 471 regarding Israel. 
Furthermore, when the Security Council addressed the assassina-
tions of the Presidents of both Rwanda and Burundi in Resolution 912, the 
Council used the same words as the attempted assassinations of the West 
Bank mayors, “shocked.”287 On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvenal 
Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira were flying 
back from a regional summit when their plane was shot down by a rocket 
while landing in Kigali, Rwanda.288 The Security Council stated it was 
“[s]hocked at the tragic incident.”289 The assassins were not ascertained so 
no specific Entity was the focus of “condemn[ation]” for the attack.290
Tying these three resolutions together, the Security Council has 
used the same words to equate the non-state sponsored attempted assassina-
tions of three mayors in lands controlled by Israel with the actual assassina-
tions of two sitting African presidents. Furthermore, the Security Council 
used harsher words to denounce the attempted mayoral assassination attri-
buted to Israel than those used to denounce the assassination attempt on the 
President of Egypt. The differences of the wording in Security Council reso-
lutions for these three different Entities continue to prove that actions attri-
buted to Israel, even if not carried out by Israel, are treated comparably 
more severe. 
9. Confidence Building Measures: Not in the Middle East 
The final area in which the Security Council has treated Israel and 
South Africa differently than other Members or regions in conflict is by use 
of the phrase “Confidence Building Measures” (CBMs). CBMs are actions 
undertaken by each party in a conflict to “prevent or reduce the occurrence 
of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions” that the other party will not abide by 
agreements or follow through with their assurances.291 Distrusting adversa-
ries are unlikely to wholly capitulate to the demands of another without 
guarantees it will be rewarded. CBMs are completed through a step-by-step 
process which helps each side prove to its opponent that it is committed to 
287 S.C. Res. 912, supra note 114. 
288 Andrea Kathryn Talentino, Rwanda, in THE COSTS OF CONFLICT: PREVENTION AND CURE 
IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 53 (Michael E. Brown & Richard N. Rosecrance eds., 1999); 
KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, RWANDA’S GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 16
(2005).
289 S.C. Res. 912, supra note 114. 
290 For an examination of the possibilities of who killed President Habyarimana, see
MOGHALU, supra note 287, at 50–52. 
291 Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Wea-
pons and on their Destruction, Final Declaration, U.N. Doc. BWC/CONF.II/13/II (1986). 
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establishing positive relations or repairing past harms. The Security Council 
has gone so far as to explicitly articulate the individual steps involved in the 
CBMs between certain parties.292
The Security Council has recommended CBMs ninety-four times to 
a wide range of Entities.293 The peace reached in the Balkans was directly 
attributable to CBMs. The Security Council seems to have experienced suc-
cess with CBMs and continues to suggest them, except in the Middle East. 
The Security Council has never suggested CBMs as a method to help re-
solve any Middle East conflict.294 In fact, CBMs are probably exactly what 
the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict need. Several countries or mediators, 
including the United States under George W. Bush, have suggested a step-
by-step process through which Israel and the Palestinians can make slow, 
but steady progress. Too often these suggestions have been ignored or 
quickly discarded. However, if the United Nations Security Council put its 
weight behind CBMs in the Middle East, it could not fail any more than 
previous efforts. The fact the Security Council refuses to engage in using all 
tools at its disposal, in order to help Israel and the Arab countries of the 
Middle East achieve peace, exposes the Council’s divergent treatment of 
Israel when compared to other Member countries.  
C. The Negroponte Doctrine 
The Negroponte Doctrine is informally referenced often, yet rarely 
discussed. This doctrine, named for Ambassador John D. Negroponte, Unit-
ed States Permanent Representative to the United Nations under President 
George W. Bush, asserts that the United States demands Israel be given 
equal treatment in the Security Council or America will use its ability to 
veto unbalanced resolutions.295 The policy declared that as of October 6, 
2003, the United States would require five principles in Security Council 
resolutions where they are applicable: 
1. A robust condemnation of acts of terrorism and all forms of incitement 
to terrorism; 
2. An explicit condemnation of . . . organizations responsible for acts of 
terrorism;  
292 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 789, U.N. Doc. S/RES/789 (Nov. 25, 1992) (“[u]rg[ing] all con-
cerned to commit themselves to the confidence-building measures set out below: (a) That, as 
a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces envisaged in the Set of Ideas, the 
number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus undergo a significant reduction and that 
a reduction of defence spending be effected in the Republic of Cyprus . . . .”). 
293 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 939, U.N. Doc. S/RES/939 (July 29, 1994). 
294 Middle East Conflict includes all conflicts pertaining to Israel, Iraq, Iran, or any other 
Middle Eastern country. 
295 United States Mission to the United Nations, Negroponte Doctrine on Security Council 
Resolution on the Middle East (Oct. 6, 2003). 
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3. Call for dismantling the infrastructure, which supports these terror op-
erations, wherever located, in compliance with UNSC Resolution 1373; 
4. Call upon all parties to make a commitment to pursue a negotiated set-
tlement; 
5. A recognition that the issue of Israeli withdrawal  . . . is connected to 
an improvement in the security situation through reciprocal steps by the 
Palestinians and Israelis, as called for by the Quartet.296
Negroponte explained, “[i]f you don't resist efforts to pass these 
lopsided resolutions, it causes the Palestinians to feel they're let off the 
hook. It vindicates their actions . . . . [E]verybody has a responsibility to 
contribute to a peaceful solution to this conflict.”297 It appears the United 
States developed this position after suffering the catastrophic terrorist attack 
on September 11, 2001. After being attacked on such a grand scale for the 
first time, more Americans understood the constant terrorist attacks Israel’s 
civilians must endure, began to empathize with Israeli civilians, and identi-
fied with Israel’s policies geared towards preventing further attacks.298
This avowed policy of the Unites States government has significant-
ly altered the dynamics of the Security Council. Israel is no longer chastised 
as frequently or harshly as it was during the Cold War era and when it is 
criticized, the resolutions are far more balanced. Since the Negroponte Doc-
trine went into effect,299 Israel has been criticized in only five resolutions.300
These five Security Council resolutions are far more balanced than any 
resolution written before this time period because each resolution—at a 
minimum—identifies Israel’s justification for taking the action that is being 
chastised. For example, when the Security Council stated it was “[a]larmed 
at the reoccupation of Palestinian cities” and “[d]emand[ed]” that Israel 
withdraw those troops, it introduced the resolution by “[c]ondemning all 
296 Id.
297 Jordan, supra note 16. 
298 For a discussion on the impact of September 11 on America’s feelings towards Israel, 
see Arunabha Bhoumik, Democratic Responses to Terrorism: A Comparative Study of the 
United States, Israel and India, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 285, 328 (2005). 
299 Although the specific tenets of the Negroponte Doctrine were not explicitly enumerated 
until October 6, 2003, the underlying principle was advanced in a speech to the General 
Assembly in August, 2002. United States Mission to the United Nations, Statement by Am-
bassador John D. Negroponte, United States Permanent Representative to the United Na-
tions, on the situation in the Middle East, at the Emergency Special Session of the General 
Assembly (Aug. 5, 2002). 
300 See S.C. Res. 1773, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1773 (Aug. 2, 2007); S.C. Res. 1701, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006); S.C. Res. 1655, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1655 (Jan. 31, 2006); S.C. 
Res. 1544, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1544 (May 19, 2004); S.C. Res. 1435, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1435 
(Sep. 24, 2002). 
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terrorist attacks against any civilians, including the terrorist bombings in 
Israel on 18 and 19 September 2002.”301
In staying true to the Negroponte Doctrine, when the wording of a 
draft resolution is not balanced in the eyes of the United States, America 
uses its veto. For example, in October of 2003, the United States vetoed a 
Security Council resolution that would have declared Israel’s construction 
of a barrier fence in the West Bank illegal.302 In explaining the reason for 
the veto, although he was not required to, Negroponte stated that the resolu-
tion was not balanced because it did not include the reasons behind Israel’s 
construction of the barrier, namely recurring terrorism and security prob-
lems.303 The Negroponte Doctrine has played a large role by affecting the 
wording used by the Security Council in its recent resolutions and has 
helped correct many of the Council’s deficiencies that led to unabashed and 
persistent chastisement of Israel in the Cold War era. 
The principles first expounded by John Negroponte have endured 
well past the completion of his term as U.S. Permanent Representative to 
the United Nations. Each of his successors has adhered to the Doctrine, al-
though all successors were appointed by the Bush administration. Only time 
will tell if the Negroponte Doctrine will survive the Bush administration, 
whether in name or in practice. Bush’s successor, President Barack Obama 
has not explicitly addressed the Negroponte doctrine. Throughout the presi-
dential campaign, numerous groups have questioned Obama’s commitment 
to Israel.304 Only time will tell if Obama will embrace the Negroponte Doc-
trine, but signals indicate he will fight for equality of all Members in the 
United Nations. For example, in January 2008, the Security Council was 
considering a resolution to denounce Israel for closing its border with Ga-
za.305 Obama, a senator at the time, wrote a letter to the Zalmay Khalilzad, 
the U.S. Representative to the United Nations at the time, urging Khalilzad 
to ensure the Security Council would either condemn the constant rocket 
attacks emanating from Gaza or not pass a resolution at all.306 This powerful 
and unsolicited letter suggests Obama’s commitment to equal treatment for 
all in the United Nations. 
301 Id.
302 United Nations News Centre, Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution on Israeli 
Barrier (Oct. 15, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=8560
&Cr=middle&Cr1=east#. 
303 Id. For other examples of the United States preventing unbalanced Security Council 
resolutions, see Jordan, supra note 16. 
304 Hilary Leila Krieger, Biden Works to Assure Jewish Activists of Barack Obama's Pro-
Israel Stance, JERUSALEM POST, Sep. 25, 2008, at 3. 
305 See Letter from Senator Barack Obama to Permanent U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations Zalmay Khalilzad (Jan. 22, 2008). 
306 Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The United Nations has clearly failed to live up to its obligation to 
treat all countries equally in the Security Council. This Note has presented 
concrete examples of the differences in word choices used in resolutions 
concerning different Entities. The strong focus on Israel—and to a lesser 
extent South Africa—was presented as evidence of the unequal treatment in 
order to confront those that seek to ignore the biases against specific Enti-
ties.
The Negroponte Doctrine has artificially forced the Security Coun-
cil to alter its methods regarding Israel; however, the Negroponte Doctrine 
is merely a band-aid on a gunshot wound. It may temporarily alleviate some 
of the immediate concerns, but it fails to fix the underlying problems that 
foster unequal treatment amongst United Nations Members in the Security 
Council. Biases only serve to politicize the Council and prevent it from 
serving its purpose. While the Negroponte Doctrine has “fixed” the results, 
it is merely another politicized bias trying to correct a more endemic anti-
Israel disposition.  
The Security Council should strive to eliminate the need for vetoes 
or protection of allies; only then will it serve its intended purpose. In order 
to permanently resolve its systemic problem, the Security Council must 
undertake a complete reformation, including a fundamental rethinking of 
how it should address threats to international peace and security. With re-
gard to the linguistic choices made by the Security Council when consider-
ing resolutions, specific words should have more rigid definitions that are 
applicable regardless of the Subject or Entity at issue. For example, perhaps 
the Security Council should not use the word “alarmed” unless fatalities 
were directly caused by an Entity’s action. While these categories should 
not be absolutely formulaic—because circumstances may frequently play at 
least some role—the Council should adopt distinct guidelines as to what 
words should be used. Preconceived notions, stigmas, and biases should be 
checked at the door to the Council’s chambers. Perhaps by reducing the 
arrogance surrounding the Council, it can be de-politicized and, therefore, 
resume its intended purpose to serve as the enforcer of international peace. 
The purpose of this Note is to identify the discrepancies in Security 
Council resolutions based on the Subject or Entity being discussed in order 
to influence the Security Council to learn from its mistakes and biases of the 
past in order to live up to the promise of its founders. This is the only way 
the Security Council can “reaffirm [its] faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small . . . .”307
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